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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
No. 20141009-CA

V.

DENNIS J. GARCIA,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
Defendant appeals from the Third District Court's order denying his several
motions to set aside and preclude enforcement of a restitution order of the Utah Board of
Pardons (Board). The district court concluded that it was divested of subject matter
~

jurisdiction over defendant's criminal case once it imposed a valid sentence; it further
concluded that Utah Code Ann.§ 77-38a-302(5)(d) foreclosed the criminal court from
making orders respecting restitution more than one year after sentencing, but instead,
vested restitution determinations after that time in the Board. Utah Code Ann.
§ 78A-4-103(2)(e) (West Supp. 2014) gives this Court jurisdiction over "appeals from a

c~urt of record in criminal cases" not involving capital or first degree felonies.

ISSUE PRESENTED UPON APPEAL
Defendant raises five issues on appeal, four of which challenge· the val~dity of the
Board's restitution order. The district court did not reach those issues because it
determined that it was without subject matter jurisdiction to address the propriety of the
Board's order. Consequently, the sole issue properly before this Court is whether the
district court correctly denied the motions on the ground that its jurisdiction was not
properly invoked.
Preservation: After the district court entered its initial ruling on defendant's
motion to set aside the restitution order, R. 279-83, defendant moved the court for a new
trial~ R. 284-85. In the memorandum supporting that ·motion, defendant argued that the
court's denial oftpe motion as not within its subject matter jurisdiction was an _error of
law. R. 296-99.
Standard of Review: "Whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction is 'a question
of_law, which we review for correctness, granting no deference to the district court."'

State v. Stone, 2013 UT App 148, iJ 4, 305 P.3d 167 (quoting State v. Nicholls, 2006 UT
76, iJ 3, 148 P.3d 990).
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS OF LAW
All relevant text of constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules pertinent to the
issue before the Court is contained in the body of this brief. Determinative provisions
include Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-27-6(4) and 77-38a-302(5)(d) (West Supp. 2014).

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case
Defendant, a former inmate who expired his term of confinement for automobile

homicide, sought to avoid the payment of Boaf:d-ordered restitution by filing a motion in
the underlying criminal case to have the sentencing court set aside the·Board's order.
After that court properly rejected defendant's attempt as beyond the scope of its subject
matter jurisdiction, defendant filed additional motions attacking the validity of the Board's
order on statutory and constitutional grounds. But the sentencing court decHned to reach
those issues, concluding that in large part, they simply restated the arguments made in
support of the original motion, and that def~ndant's new arguments again fell outside the
scope of the court's subject matter jurisdiction~ In this appeal, defendant seeks to have
this Court decide the issues that the district court correctly declined to consider.
B.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below
Defendant filed his motion to set aside the Board's restitution orde~, R. 122-25

(motion) and 131-48 (memorandum), after the Board submitted the order to the
sentencing court for docketing and collection, as directed by Utah Code Ann.

§ 77-27-6(4). R. 119-20. Following responses filed by the Board, R. 155-218, and the
Office of State Debt Collection (OSDC), R. 221-75, the district court held a hearing,
R. 278, and entered a memorandum decision and order denying the motion. R. 279-83.
The court observed that in the underlying criminal action, it had not determined the

3

amount of restitution owed within one year of sentencing defendant, under section
77-38a-302(d)(i). R. 279. It further noted that on October 7, 2010, ~fter defe1:1dant's

G

original parole hearing, the Board issued its final decision ordering defendant to. expire
his five~year sentence an~ to pay restitution of $7,000.00. R. 280; see also R. 188 and
270 (Board decision). The court pointed to precedent establishing that a sentencing court
loses subject matter jurisdiction over the case once it imposes a valid sentence, and
deter111ined that section 77-38a-302(5)(d)(i)'s one-year limitation on court-ordered
restitution explicitly deprived the court.of continuing jurisdiction over restitution.
Consequently, the court concluded that it was without power to set aside the Board's
order. R. 28L For that reason, it denied defendant's motion.
Defendant responded. by filing three additional motions attacking the validity of
the Board's order: (1) a motion for new trial, R. 284-85; (2) a motion for a judicial
determination that Utah Co.de Ann-.§
77-27-5(3), which prohibits judicial
.
. revi~w of the
Board's r~stitution orders, is unconstitutional, R. 288-89; and (3) a motion to set aside the
civil judgment implementing the restitution order. R. 545-46. The district court observed
that the new motions were essentially a "rehash of (defendant's] prior arguments [that]
adds no persuasive authority to change the Court's decision." R. 594,606. The court
denied all three motions and concluded that its loss of subject matter jurisdiction after
sentencing foreclosed it from proceeding on defendant's "additional arguments that (a) the
Order of Restitution is void for being served beyond the 60-day rule, Utah Code Ann.

4
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\IV

§ 77-27-6(4), (b) the Order of Restitution is barred by the statute of limitations, and (c)

;,;,

.

the Order of Restitution is void as based on an unconstitutional statute." R. 5.95, 606.
Defendant then filed his notice of appeal. R. 611-12.

C.

Statement of Relevant Facts
The relevant facts are primarily those reflected in the course of proceedings

detailed above, and can best be understood in light ·of brief background information. On
June 2, 2008, defendant was convicted on a plea of guilty to automobile homicide, a third
degree felony, and sentenced to an indeterminate term not to exceed five years in the Utah
~

State Prison. R. 169. The Presentence Report, under the caption Victim Impact
Statement and Restitution, states that "[a]ccording to the Utah Office of Crime Victim
Reparations they paid $7,000 for funeral expenses in this offense. Reference CVR
# 151627 for restitution payments." R. 176. At no time during the criminal proceedings
did defendant challenge the restitution amount listed in the report.
At defendant's orig!nal parole hearing on October 5, 2010, the Board's hearing
officer noted the $7,000 paid for funeral expenses by the state agency, and defendant
made no response. R. 185. When asked whether there "was anything else you'd like to
.talk about[,]" R. 186, defendant replied, "Not that I could think of, l think we've covered
it." R. 186. The Board's order, dated October 7, 2010, stated that "[t]he restitution owed
of $7,000.00 on Case# [sic] 06-1607 will be forwarded to the sentencing Court for a Civil

5

Judgement [sic]." R. 188. 1 Later, in response to a letter from defendant's family, the
Board's Senior H~aring Officer, Kent Jones, advised,

f'•,

~

If [defendant] is working inside, it is hoped he has already started to pay ~e
$7,000 burial expenses. As you have now brought that to our attention, I
will send .a copy of this to Crime Victims Reparations who will be seeking
that restitution amount (CVR#. 151627) as we will pursue a Civil Judgment
against him.
R. 192. Defend&nt was sent a copy of the letter. But despite being put on notice of
F-1

w

restitution by the Board's order and correspondence, defendant neither objected to the
imposition of restitution nor made any restitqtion payments during his incarceration. Not
until his sentence expired and the Board requested the Third District Court to enter the
order_ o~ its docket as a ~ivil judgment, R. l 94-95, did defendant attempt to challenge it.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Under this Court's prec.edents, a district court loses subject matter jurisdiction over
a criminal case once it imposes a valiq. ·senten~e. Defendant does not dispute the validity
of his sentence in this case. Because defendant's motions did not address the validity of
his sentence, the jurisdiction of the sentencing court was not properly invoked. For this
reason, the district court co.rrectly rejected defendant's attempts to challenge the Board's
order of restitution in the context of his criminal case.

1

Three days later, the Board entered an amended order acknowledging the Board's
awareness that the April 15, 2013 expiration of defendant's sentence "is not a regular
release date. CLERICAL ERROR CORRECTED." R. 190.. No substantive changes
were made to the earlier·order.
6

Utah Code Ann.§ 77-27-6(4) governs the collection of Board-ordered restitution.
Once the order is forwarded to the sentencing court, it is entered on the judgment docket
and subject to the same rules and procedures available to enforce any civil judgment for
money. The ministerial act of docketing the judgment in the sentencing court does not
reopen the criminal case for Sijbstantive challenges.
--

Because the district court had no authority to address the merits of defendant's
motions in the context of the criminal case, it had no choice but to deny them on
jurisdictional ground~. Its decision warrants this Court's affirmance.
ARGUMENT
THE DISTRICT COURT'S JURISDICTION IN DEFENDANT'S
CRIMINAL CASE DID NOT EXTEND TO ADJUDICATING THE
VALIDITY OF BOARD-ORDERED RESTITUTION
The motions defendant filed in his criminal case after the expiration of his
sentence all have the same objective: to attack the validity of the Board's restitution
order. And they all rest on the same unstated premise: that the sentencing court, by
virtue of its statutory duty to docket the Board's order for collection as a civil judgment,
~

may rule on the validity of the order. That premise is erroneous.
This Court's precedents make clear that in a criminal action, "(o]nce a court
imposes a valid sentence, it loses subject matter jurisdiction over the case." State v.

Montoya, 825 P.2d 676,679 (Utah App. 1991); see also State v. Vaughn, 2011 UT App
411, ,II 1,266 P.3d 202 (quoting Montoya). While Utah Code Ann.§ 77-38a-302(d)(i)
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(West Supp. 2014) confers on that court a duty to "determine complete restitution and
court-ordered restitution, and [to] make all restitµtion orders at the time of sentencing if
feasible, otherwise within one year after sentencing[,]" that duty is subject to divestment:
"Any pecuniary damages that have not been determined by the court within one year after
sentencing may be determined by the Board of Pardons and Parole." Id. ·-

§ 77-38a-302(d)(ii). Because the sentencing court in this case did not determine
defendant's restitution within the statute's one-year deadline, its authority to do so was
divested by statute in favor of the Board.2
Consistent with the statute, the Board, in its October 10, 2010 order, determined
that defendant owed $7,000.00 in restitution. R. 188. And consistent with Utah Code
. Ann.§ 77~27-6(4) (West Supp. 2014), once it did so, it "referred [its order] to the district
court for civil collection remedies." See R. 194-95. The purely ministerial act of
docketing the Board order does not reinvest the sentencing· court with jurisdiction that has
lapsed by operation ofstatute. Rather, "[t]he eritcy shall constitute a lien and is subject to
the same rules as a judgment for money" in a civil action." Id. § 77-27-6(4) (emphasis
added). The statute's mandatory language does not authorize the sentencing court to
second-guess the order's validity.

2

As the district court correctly noted in its order, defendant's reliance on State v.
Laycock, 2009 UT 53,214 P.3d 104, is misplaced. While Laycock permitted the trial
court to order restitution beyond one year from sentencing, the statute did not contain the
one-year limit when ·the Laycockdecision was rendered. See R. 595, 606.
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To the extent that defendant complains of alleged procedural defects in the Board's
actions, he is not without a remedy. Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(d)(2)(D) governs claims that
"the Board of P3:rdons and Parole has exceeded its jurisdiction or failed to perform an act
~

required by constitutional or statutory law." But def~ndant did not invoke the district
court's jurisdiction under Rule 65B, which empowers that court to consider his
substantive claims. Although Utah's district courts possess jurisdiction over all civil and
criminal matters not excluded by Utah's constitution or prohibited by law, see Utah Code
Ann.§ 78A-5;..102 (West Supp.2014), when that jurisdiction has been lost-as has
happened here-the court may nonetheless lack the authority to proceed. "[A] court may
.

.

'

have jurisqiction in the strict sense, but nevertheless lack jurisdiction (or power) to act
~

except in a particular manner, or to give certain kinds of relief, or to act without the
occurrence of certain procedural prerequisites." Berman v. Yarbrough, 2011 UT 79, iI 13
n.5, 267 P.3d 905 (quoting l'eople v. Lara, 48 Cal. 4th 216,226 P.3d 322, 328 (Cal.

iJ)

2010) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Accord Atwood v. Cox, 88 Utah 437,_55 P.2d
377, 381 (Utah 1936) (proper invocation of jurisdiction includes.both the power to
entertain a cause of action and the filing of a proper pleading that shows the action relates
to subject matter over which the court has jurisdiction to proceed). As the Atwood court
..;;;

observed, "Jurisdiction can never depend upon the merits of the case brought before the
court, but only upon its right to hear and decide at all." Id.
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The sentencing court's imposition of a lawful sentence, and its failure to determine
restitution within one year thereafter, divested it of further subject matter jurisdiction in
defendant's criminal case. Consequently, the court 9orrectly ruled that it had no authority
to proceed on the merits of defendant's motions. Defendant's failure to overcome that
fundamental premise deprives this Court of grounds to disturb the sentencing court's
decision.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons explained above, the State respectfully _requests this Court to
affirm the decision of the district court in this matter.

{LLL
s:

Nancy L. Kemp
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellee
(:~-
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